However, we recognise with Malatesta that individuals can coordinate their activities in so-called “common actions” and thereby work to achieve common purposes. If there are no collective actions, we argue, then there can be no collective responsibility since the latter concept depends on the former as its premise: only agents who are able to act intentionally can be considered responsible. Upon reviewing key theories of action, we will claim that collectives can act only if they can have minds, and that this thesis is difficult if not impossible to defend. We will substantiate Malatesta’s rejection of the concept of collective responsibility by rejecting the concept of collective action to begin with. Thus, the concept of collective responsibility is at odds with anarchist principles of individual autonomy and free initiative.
Moreover, he considers use of the concept by anarchists to be “a general irresponsibility in practice.” For it threatens an executive committee forcing individuals to act a certain way, since all associated anarchists will prospectively be held responsible for the actions of some, or forcing individuals to take responsibility for the actions that others have committed regardless of the individual’s lack of involvement or disapproval.
In short letters to Nestor Makhno and concerning the Platform (1927-30), Errico Malatesta asserts that the notion of “collective responsibility” is “a moral absurdity in theory” because only individuals can be held morally responsible for their actions.
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